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Previous research has examined the effects of emotional experience (i.e., the ease
with which words evoke emotion information) in semantic categorization (SCT), word
naming, and Stroop tasks (Newcombe et al., 2012; Siakaluk et al., 2014; Moffat et al.,
2015). However, to date there are no published reports on whether emotional experience
influences performance in the lexical decision task (LDT). In the present study, we
examined the influence of emotional experience in LDT using three different stimulus sets.
In Experiment 1 we used a stimulus set used by both Kousta et al. (2009; Experiment
1) and Yap and Seow (2014) that is comprised of 40 negative, 40 positive, and 40
neutral words; in Experiment 2 we used a stimulus set comprised of 150 abstract nouns;
and in Experiment 3 we used a stimulus set comprised of 373 verbs. We observed
facilitatory effects of emotional experience in each of the three experiments, such that
words with higher emotional experience ratings were associated with faster response
latencies. These results are important because the influence of emotional experience:
(a) is observed in stimulus sets comprised of different types of words, demonstrating the
generalizability of the effect in LDT; (b) accounts for LDT response latency variability above
and beyond the influences of valence and arousal, and is thus a robust dimension of
conceptual knowledge; (c) suggests that a richer representation of emotional experience
provides more reliable evidence that a stimulus is a word, which facilitates responding in
LDT; and (d) is consistent with grounded cognition frameworks that propose that emotion
information may be grounded in bodily experience with the world (Barsalou, 2003, 2009;
Vigliocco et al., 2009).
Keywords: emotional experience, lexical decision, semantic richness, conceptual knowledge, grounded cognition,
visual word recognition
INTRODUCTION
Grounded cognition is the theoretical perspective that much of conceptual knowledge is derived
through bodily experience with the world. Initially, the theoretical and empirical focus of cognitive
scientists using grounded cognition frameworks was to examine how sensorimotor interactions
with the world influence the acquisition and retrieval of conceptual knowledge (Meteyard and
Vigliocco, 2008). According to Barsalou’s (1999) perceptual symbol systems framework, conceptual
knowledge is inherently multimodal, in that its different facets are stored and retrieved from
neural systems dedicated to processing specific kinds of sensorimotor information. For example,
knowledge of the concept “peach” would be stored in neural systems dedicated to processing visual,
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olfactory, gustatory, and tactile information of peaches, as well
as neural systems dedicated to processing motor information,
such as how one’s body can interact with peaches (e.g., reaching
for and picking up a peach from a bowl and then bringing
it to one’s mouth to bite it). Conceptual processing occurs via
simulation, or the partial reenactment of the different neural
states that were involved during previous bodily experience with
a particular concept. For the example of “peach,” conceptual
understanding of what peaches taste like arises from simulation
of previous gustatory experiences involving peaches, whereas
conceptual understanding of what one can physically do with
peaches arises from simulation of previous motor experiences
involving peaches.
The perceptual symbol systems framework has been expanded
to include the notion of situated conceptualization (Barsalou,
2003, 2009; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011; Barrett et al., 2014),
which is the idea that situated context plays an integral role in
the development of conceptual knowledge. Continuing with the
example of the “peach” concept, most people have a much more
nuanced conceptual understanding of peaches than merely what
they look or taste like (as important as that is), and this is a
result of information gained from different situational contexts
in which one may have experiences with peaches. For example,
part of our understanding that peaches are fruit may arise from
the fact that they are sold in the produce section or that they
grow on trees; situational contexts that allow for relevant bodily
experiences in order to gain these types of conceptual knowledge
(e.g., when walking through the grocery section of a supermarket
one can see that peaches are sold in close proximity with other
kinds of fruit, or when walking through an orchard one may see
peach trees intermixed with apple or cherry trees).
As ubiquitous as sensorimotor experience is in our lives,
emotionality is also an integral aspect of human experience.
Recent theoretical work has incorporated this fact and begun
to examine how emotion information may be involved in the
acquisition and retrieval of conceptual knowledge (e.g., Dolan,
2002; Parisi, 2011). In addition to providing a compelling
account of how situational context allows for varied sensorimotor
experiences to become part of conceptual knowledge, situated
conceptualization also provides an account of how situational
context allows for varied emotional experiences to be represented.
One possibility is that internal emotion systems track important
environmental features and events in such a way that emotion
information plays a key role in the development of conceptual
knowledge. Imagine a situation in which your grandparents
are visiting, and from previous experience you know that it is
highly likely that they will bake your favorite kind of pie—peach
pie! After a long day at work, you may be excited by the
possibility of coming home to a freshly baked peach pie, and
derive physical and emotional pleasure from the experience.
The particular and various aspects of this experience—the
presence of your grandparents, the infrequency of their visits
and subsequent baking of peach pies, knowing they baked
the pie for you, the pleasant conversation, and the bodily
experience of eating a slice of the freshly baked peach pie—
are all pertinent to your particular conceptual understanding
of “peach.” Similarly, in Vigliocco et al. (2009) framework
of semantic representation, emotion information is proposed
to be an important aspect of conceptual knowledge, and
grounded in bodily experience. They also suggested that emotion
information might play more of a role for abstract concepts than
concrete ones.
There has been a recent increase in research efforts to better
understand how emotion informationmay influence the retrieval
of conceptual knowledge in lexical processing. In a paper in the
original Meaning in mind: Semantic richness effects in language
processing Research Topic (Pexman et al., 2013), Newcombe
et al. (2012) derived a new dimension of emotionality they
called emotional experience, which measures the ease with which
words evoke emotional experiences or information. The intuition
underlying the development of this particular emotionality
dimension was that concepts may vary in the extent to which
they are associated with knowledge gained through emotion
experience. For example, Newcombe et al. proposed that it is
more likely that emotion information is relevant to the concept
“justice” (e.g., there may be numerous situational contexts in
which “justice” occurs, such as in courtrooms, playgrounds, and
family rooms, and may be associated with a variety of emotional
responses, such as joy, dismay, anger, or frustration) than to the
concept “moment,” for which it is difficult to think of any kind
of emotion information that would be relevant. Siakaluk et al.
(2014) further suggested that emotional experience captures core
person-environment regularities involved in emotionality that
are present across the variety of instances in which conceptual
knowledge is relevant. They used the example of the concept
“crisis.” The instances in which conceptual knowledge pertinent
to this concept are evoked will have many differences, such
as the people, objects, or events involved. However, there are
likely to be certain person-environment regularities across these
different instances, such as something going terribly wrong for
an individual, certain (minimal) levels of physical, psychological,
and/or emotional intensity for the individuals involved in the
situation, and the need for one or more individuals to react
quickly and effectively, among other regularities. Thus, Siakaluk
et al. proposed that the dimension of emotional experience
captures the shared, core, and consistent emotional states that are
experienced in different situated bodily contexts.
To date, several studies have examined the effects of emotional
experience in semantic categorization (SCT), word naming, and
Stroop tasks, but not yet in the lexical decision task (LDT).
Newcombe et al. (2012) reported that emotional experience
facilitated processing for abstract words in SCT (using the “Is
the word abstract?” decision category) but inhibited processing
for concrete words in SCT (using the “Is the word concrete?”
decision category). Moffat et al. (2015) replicated the above
pattern of emotional experience effects in a verbal SCT, in
which their participants made verbal responses rather than
button press responses. Moffat et al. further reported facilitatory
emotional experience effects for abstract words, but not concrete
words, in word naming. In addition, Siakaluk et al. (2014)
reported that emotional experience interfered with color naming
performance for abstract words in the Stroop task. Importantly,
in the Moffat et al. and Siakaluk et al. studies, the effects of
emotional experience were robust even after the influence of
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other measures of emotion information (valence and arousal)
were statistically removed.
The purpose of the present study was to examine the effects
of emotional experience in LDT using different types of words
(i.e., words selected on a categorical basis on the dimension of
valence, Experiment 1; abstract nouns, Experiment 2; and verbs,
Experiment 3). We felt this was important for two primary and
related reasons. First, LDT is the most frequently used task in
the visual word recognition literature for examining semantic
richness effects (Pexman, 2012). Second, there is a growing
literature demonstrating that valence, which is the positive-
negative (or pleasant-unpleasant) dimension of emotionality,
and arousal, which is the calm-excited dimension of emotionality
(Bradley and Lang, 1999), influence responding in LDT (e.g.,
Estes and Adelman, 2008; Larsen et al., 2008; Kousta et al., 2009;
Adelman and Estes, 2013; Kuperman et al., 2014; Recio et al.,
2014; Scott et al., 2014; Vinson et al., 2014; Yap and Seow, 2014;
Imbir et al., 2016). As noted, Moffat et al. (2015) and Siakaluk
et al. (2014) reported that the effects of emotional experience
were robust in SCT, word naming, and Stroop tasks when the
influences of valence and arousal were statistically removed. We
wanted to examine whether the same would be true in LDT. We
examined these issues in three LDTs; as noted, each LDT used a
different stimulus set comprised of different types of words.
EXPERIMENT 1
The goal of our first experiment was to investigate whether
emotional experience might play an explanatory role in the
pattern of results observed for the negative, positive, and neutral
words used in two previous LDT studies: Kousta et al. (2009;
Experiment 1) and Yap and Seow (2014). This particular pattern
of results involved faster LDT latencies to the negative and
positive words compared to the neutral words, and no difference
in latencies to the negative and positive words. The reason we
used this particular stimulus set is because it seemed likely that
relatively high negative and high positive words should also be
relatively high on emotional experience, as compared to the
neutral words. To this end, emotional experience ratings were
collected from 30 undergraduate students from the University
of Northern British Columbia (UNBC) (the instructions for
collecting emotional experience ratings are provided in the
Supplementary Material). The mean valence, arousal, and
emotional experience ratings for the negative, positive, and
neutral words are shown in Table 11. In addition to the obvious
(and intended) significant differences between the three word
types on the dimension of valence, one-way between-items
analyses of variance (ANOVA) revealed: (a) a significant effect
of arousal, F2(2,115) = 21.55, MSe = 0.95, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.27,
with follow up tests showing that the negative words (p2 < 0.001)
and the positive words (p2 < 0.001) had significantly higher
arousal ratings than the neutral words, and that there was no
difference in arousal ratings between the negative and positive
1There were two neutral words (ether and rabbi) with error rates greater than 30%,
and they were removed from all descriptive and inferential analyses reported for
the experiment.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for the negative, positive, and neutral
words used in Experiment 1.
Variable Negative Positive Neutral
M SD M SD M SD
Concreteness 437 109.6 440 103.1 462 99.6
Imageability 497 70.5 503 79.6 486 85.5
Age of acquisition 395 82.4 385 105.3 400 103.6
Familiarity 520 46.2 523 51.3 517 53.7
Log frequency 9.3 1.2 9.2 1.3 9.2 1.3
Orthographic neighborhood 3.9 6.0 4.0 5.7 3.9 5.7
Letters 5.8 1.5 5.8 1.6 5.8 1.5
Syllables 1.8 0.8 1.9 0.7 1.8 0.7
Morphemes 1.2 0.4 1.3 0.6 1.2 0.4
Mean positional bigram frequency 3259 1723 2923 1357 3103 1657
Emotional experience 4.3 1.0 4.4 1.2 2.6 1.2
Valence 2.5 0.6 7.5 0.6 5.1 0.2
Extremity of valence 2.5 0.6 2.5 0.6 0.1 0.1
Arousal 5.6 0.9 5.8 1.2 4.5 0.7
words (p2 = 0.391); and (b) a significant effect of emotional
experience, F2(2, 115) = 28.57, MSe = 1.31, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.33,
with follow up tests showing that the negative words (p2 < 0.001)
and the positive words (p2 < 0.001) had significantly higher
emotional experience ratings than the neutral words, and that
there was no difference in emotional experience ratings between
the negative and positive words (p2 = 0.745). Thus, we can
conclude that the negative and positive words in this stimulus set
were not equivalent to the neutral words in either rated arousal
or emotional experience.
With these emotional experience ratings in hand, we turned
to the main purpose of Experiment 1: to investigate whether
there were effects of emotional experience above and beyond
any influence of valence and arousal in LDT responses to
this stimulus set used by Kousta et al. (2009; Experiment 1)
and Yap and Seow (2014). The Kousta et al. study involved a
yes/no procedure (in which overt responses are made to both
the experimental words and the nonwords), whereas the Yap
and Seow study used both a yes/no procedure and a go/no-
go procedure (in which overt responses are made to only
the experimental words and no responses are made to the
nonwords). Because Yap and Seow reported the same general
pattern of effects as Kousta et al. using both procedures, we
too used the yes/no and go/no-go procedures to provide as
full an examination of the influence of emotional experience
as possible for this stimulus set. The hypothesis we tested in
Experiment 1 was that there would be significant effects of
emotional experience above and beyond any effects of valence
and arousal.
Method
Ethics Approval and Informed Consent
All of the experiments reported here were conducted with
the approval of the Research Ethics Boards at UNBC and the
University of Calgary (UC), and all participants herein gave
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1157
Siakaluk et al. Emotional Experience in Lexical Decision
their written informed consent to participate at their institution
of study.
Participants
Two groups of UNBC undergraduate students participated in
Experiment 1: one group of 34 individuals participated in the
yes/no LDT and a different group of 33 individuals participated in
the go/no-go LDT. All participants were native English speakers,
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and received
bonus course credit for their participation.
Stimuli
Kousta et al. (2009) collected valence and arousal ratings for a
large set of words using the procedures in ANEW (Bradley and
Lang, 1999), and merged their ratings with those of the ANEW
database. Based on these ratings, they selected 40 negative words,
40 positive words, and 40 neutral words. These words served
as the stimuli for their Experiment 1, as well as for the two
experiments reported by Yap and Seow (2014).We also used these
words in the present experiment. These stimuli were matched
for the following characteristics: concreteness, imageability,
and familiarity (all from the MRC psycholinguistic database;
Coltheart, 1981), log frequency, orthographic neighborhood,
number of letters, syllables, andmorphemes, andmean positional
bigram frequency (all from the English Lexicon Project database;
Balota et al., 2007), and age of acquisition (from the Bristol norms
database; Stadthagen-Gonzalez and Davis, 2006). As noted, the
emotional experience ratings were collected from 30 UNBC
undergraduate students (these individuals did not participate in
any of the subsequent experiments described below). Means and
SDs for the predictor variables are shown in Table 1. The 120
nonwords used by Yap and Seow (2014) were used in the present
experiment and were matched to the words on number of letters.
Apparatus and Procedure
The 120 words and 120 nonwords were presented in both LDTs.
For the yes/no LDT, participants were instructed to respond
to the words by pressing the “?” key and to the nonwords by
pressing the “z” key on the computer keyboard. For the go/no-go
LDT, participants were instructed to respond only to the words,
again by pressing the “?” key. They were further instructed not
to respond to the nonwords, and were told that if no response
was made the stimulus would be automatically replaced by the
next stimulus after 2500 ms. All participants were instructed to
make their responses as quickly and as accurately as possible.
The stimuli were presented in the center of a color VGAmonitor
driven by a Pentium-class microcomputer running DirectRT
software (http://www.empirisoft.com/DirectRT.aspx). A trial was
initiated by a fixation marker that appeared at the center of
the computer display for 1000 ms and was then replaced by a
stimulus item. The inter-trial interval was 2000 ms. Stimulus
order was randomized separately for each participant. Following
every 60 trials, participants had an opportunity to take a break,
and continued when ready by pressing the spacebar. Before
beginning either LDT, participants were given practice trials
consisting of 10 words and 10 nonwords.
Data Analysis
In the first analysis for each LDT we used ANOVA to determine
if our results replicated the main effect of valence observed in
Kousta et al.’s (2009; Experiment 1) yes/no experiment and in
Yap and Seow’s (2014) yes/no and go/no-go experiments. Both
by-subjects (F1) and by-items (F2) ANOVAs were conducted.
In the second analysis for each LDT we used by-subjects (F1)
ANOVA to determine if our results replicated the effects of
valence in response latency distributional analyses in order
to provide a full attempt at replicating the results of Yap
and Seow. Lastly, we conducted separate hierarchical multiple
regression analyses for the yes/no and go/no-go LDTs. We
followed the coding of valence scheme used by Adelman and
Estes (2013): valence ratings and extremity of valence values (i.e.,
the absolute distance from themidpoint of the valence scale) were
entered together. Adelman and Estes proposed that the extremity
of valence dimension determines whether both positive and
negative stimuli are responded to differently than neutral stimuli,
whereas the valence dimension determines whether positive
stimuli are responded to differently than negative stimuli. As
such, this coding scheme provides a thorough test of potential
effects of the valence dimension. This valence coding scheme
was used in all three experiments reported in the present study.
In step 1 of the regression analyses we entered the following
predictors: concreteness, imageability, familiarity, log frequency,
orthographic neighborhood, number of letters, syllables, and
morphemes, mean positional bigram frequency, and age of
acquisition. These step 1 variables have all been shown to
influence lexical processing, and we wanted to account for
variance due to these non-emotion factors before the emotion
dimensions were entered, in order to evaluate the effects of each
emotion dimension independent of these factors. In step 2 we
entered the following predictors: valence, extremity of valence,
and arousal. In step 3 we entered emotional experience.
Results and Discussion
The following procedure for removal of outliers was used for
each LDT. First, response latencies faster than 250 ms or slower
than 2000 ms were treated as outliers and removed from the
data sets. Second, for each participant, response latencies greater
than 2.5 SDs from the cell mean of each condition were treated
as outliers and removed from the data sets. A total of 117
responses (2.89% of the data) and 144 responses (3.70% of the
data) were removed by this procedure from the yes/no and
go/no-go LDTs, respectively. Word response errors comprised
only 2.12 and 0.67% of trials from the yes/no and go/no-go LDTs,
respectively. As such, the response error data were not analyzed.
The raw lexical decision latencies were z score transformed for
themultiple regression analyses. Zero-order correlations between
the predictor variables and the criterion variables are presented
in Table 2.
Yes/No LDT
The ANOVA results included a main effect of valence,
F1(2, 66) = 47.31,MSe= 376.74, p< 0.001, η
2
p = 0.59; F2(2, 113) =
13.05, MSe = 1713.15, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.19. As was the case
with the Kousta et al. (2009) and Yap and Seow (2014) studies,
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TABLE 2 | Zero-order correlations between the criterion variables and the predictor variables in Experiment 1.
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Concreteness −
2. Imageability 0.79* −
3. AoA −0.18* −0.36* −
4. Familiarity −0.11 0.02 −0.52* −
5. Log frequency −0.32* −0.29* −0.27* 0.56* −
6. N 0.07 0.13 −0.37* 0.18* 0.25* −
7. Letters −0.12 −0.13 0.25* 0.01 −0.09 −0.72* −
8. Syllables −0.16 −0.14 0.21* 0.03 −0.01 −0.54* 0.72* −
9. Morphemes −0.31* −0.19* 0.25* 0.06 0.05 −0.26* 0.42* 0.53* −
10. MPBF −0.00 −0.00 0.09 0.08 −0.02 −0.36* 0.65* 0.38* 0.20* −
11. EE −0.42* −0.13 −0.04 0.28* 0.27* −0.06 0.21* 0.17 0.30* 0.14 −
12. Valence −0.01 0.03 −0.07 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.09 −0.08 0.04 −
13. Extremity −0.09 0.13 −0.02 0.04 −0.00 −0.02 −0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.63* 0.01 −
14. Arousal −0.12 0.06 −0.02 0.03 0.08 0.07 −0.00 0.03 0.09 −0.03 0.55* 0.09 0.53* −
15. Yes/no 0.20* 0.03 0.30* −0.48* −0.52* −0.14 0.11 0.05 −0.07 0.15 −0.61* −0.15 −0.45* −0.34* −
16. Go/no-go 0.18 0.01 0.36* −0.53* −0.51* −0.12 0.09 0.02 −0.05 0.10 −0.56* −0.06 −0.33* −0.22* 0.77* −
*p < 0.05. AoA, age of acquisition; N, orthographic neighborhood; MPBF, mean positional bigram frequency; EE, emotional experience; Yes/no, yes/no lexical decision task latency;
Go/no, go lexical decision task latency.
both the negative words (M = 649, SD = 36.9) (p1 < 0.001;
p2 < 0.001) and the positive words (M = 636, SD = 41.0) (p1
< 0.001; p2 < 0.001) were responded to faster than the neutral
words (M = 683, SD = 46.3). However, unlike the above studies,
here the positive words were responded to faster than the negative
words, although the effect was significant only in the subjects
analysis (p1 = 0.003) and not in the items analysis (p2 = 0.151).
As noted, Yap and Seow also conducted response latency
distributional analyses, and for completeness of replication of
their study, we too conducted response latency distributional
analyses. In order to do so, ex-Gaussian parameters, (µ, σ ,
τ ) were obtained using the quantile maximum likelihood
estimation procedure in Cousineau et al. (2004) QMPE program.
Distributional shifts are reflected by changes in µ, whereas
modulations in the tail of the distribution are reflected by τ . This
allows changes in mean response latency to be partitioned into
distributional shifting (µ) and distributional skewing (τ ). Raw
data were fitted to the theoretical ex-Gaussian function using the
maximum number of quantiles, and all fits converged within 250
iterations. For µ, there was a main effect of valence, F1(2, 66) =
10.54, MSe = 848.20, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.24; the negative words
(M = 541, SD = 70.4) (p = 0.005) and the positive words (M =
535, SD = 62.6) (p < 0.001) were responded to faster than the
neutral words (M = 566, SD = 79), but there was no significant
difference between the positive and negative words. For σ and τ ,
the main effect of valence was not significant.
The results of the regression analysis are shown in the top
half of Table 32. In step 2, there was a significant change in
latency variability (∆R2 = 0.16). The only predictor in step 2
that accounted for a significant amount of unique variability
was extremity of valence (sr = −0.29), which indicates that
2Discussion regarding the hierarchical multiple regression analyses for each
experiment of the present study will focus on results at steps 2 and 3.
faster latencies were associated withmore extreme valence values,
regardless of valence polarity. In step 3, there was a significant
change in latency variability (∆R2 = 0.08), with faster latencies
associated with higher emotional experience ratings (sr=−0.28).
Thus, in the yes/no LDT, our hypothesis was supported, such
that the dimension of emotional experience accounted for unique
latency variability above and beyond that accounted for by
valence, extremity of valence, and arousal.
Go/No-Go LDT
The sphericity assumption was violated in the ANOVA by
subjects, so we used the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. There
was a main effect of valence, F1(1.550, 48.961) = 11.89, MSe =
1753.79, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.27; F2(2, 113) = 6.70,MSe= 2766.75, p
= 0.002, η2p = 0.11. As was the case with the Yap and Seow (2014)
go/no-go LDT, both the negative words (M = 627, SD = 47.5)
(p1 = 0.001; p2 = 0.003) and the positive words (M = 623, SD
= 43.8) (p1 = 0.001; p2 = 0.001) were responded to faster than
the neutral words (M = 664, SD= 65.5). Also consistent with the
Yap and Seow results, there was no difference between latencies
for the negative and positive words (p1 = 0.633; p2 = 0.718).
In the response latency distributional analysis, forµ, there was
a main effect of valence, F1(2, 64) = 4.43,MSe= 625.51, p= 0.016,
η2p = 0.12; the negative words (M = 513, SD = 45.6) (p = 0.039)
and the positive words (M = 507, SD = 50.4) (p = 0.015) were
responded to faster than the neutral words (M= 525, SD= 50.6),
but there was no significant difference between the positive and
negative words. For σ and τ , the main effect of valence was not
significant.
The results of the response latency distributional analyses
for the yes/no and go/no-go LDTs of the present experiment
are partly consistent with Yap and Seow’s (2014) findings.
Like Yap and Seow, there were valence effects in the pattern
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TABLE 3 | Results of hierarchical multiple regression analyses of response
latencies for Experiment 1.
Variable B SEB β sr ∆R2 R2
YES/NO LDT
Step 1 (control variables) 0.41***
Concreteness 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.20**
Imageability −0.00 0.00 −0.35 −0.19*
AoA 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04
Familiarity −0.00 0.00 −0.28 −0.20**
Log frequency −0.08 0.02 −0.38 −0.29***
N 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.11
Letters 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.08
Syllables 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03
Morphemes −0.04 0.06 −0.06 −0.05
MPBF 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.11
Step 2 0.16*** 0.57***
Valence −0.01 0.01 −0.07 −0.07
Extremity −0.08 0.02 −0.36 −0.29***
Arousal −0.03 0.02 −0.11 −0.09
Step 3 0.08*** 0.65***
Emotional experience −0.09 0.02 −0.48 −0.28***
GO/NO-GO LDT
Step 1 (control variables) 0.40***
Concreteness 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.16*
Imageability −0.00 0.00 −0.25 −0.14†
AoA 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.11
Familiarity −0.00 0.00 −0.29 −0.21**
Log frequency −0.08 0.03 −0.32 −0.24**
N 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.12
Letters 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.07
Syllables 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04
Morphemes −0.04 0.07 −0.06 −0.05
MPBF 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
Step 2 0.08** 0.48***
Valence −0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.01
Extremity −0.07 0.02 −0.26 −0.21**
Arousal −0.02 0.03 −0.07 −0.06
Step 3 0.10*** 0.58***
Emotional experience −0.13 0.03 −0.55 −0.32***
†
p= 0.071; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. AoA, age of acquisition; N, orthographic
neighborhood; MPBF, mean positional bigram frequency.
in mean response latencies, as indicated by µ, such that
responses to the positive and negative words were faster than
to the neutral words, but there was no difference between
the positive and negative words. Interestingly, unlike Yap
and Seow, there were no valence effects mediated by τ
in either LDT. Although the reasons for this discrepancy
are unclear, the results suggest that valence effects in the
present experiment predominately reflect earlier lexical processes
rather than later processes that are specific to word/nonword
discrimination.
The results of the regression analysis are shown in the bottom
half of Table 3. In step 2, there was a significant change in latency
variability (∆R2 = 0.08). Again, the only predictor in step 2
that accounted for a significant amount of unique variability
was extremity of valence (sr = −0.21). In step 3, there was a
significant change in latency variability (∆R2 = 0.10), with faster
latencies associated with higher emotional experience ratings (sr
=−0.32). As was the case in the yes/no LDT, our hypothesis was
supported in the go/no-go LDT, such that emotional experience
accounted for a significant amount of unique latency variability
above and beyond that accounted for by valence, extremity of
valence, and arousal.
Using the experimental stimuli of Kousta et al. (2009;
Experiment 1) and Yap and Seow (2014), we replicated their
findings of faster latencies to negative and positive words than
to neutral words in both yes/no and go/no-go LDTs. For
both LDTs, in step 2 only extremity of valence accounted for
a significant amount of unique latency variability. Latencies
were faster to the negative and positive words than to the
neutral words, but there were no differences in latencies between
the negative and positive words (recall that the slight latency
advantage to the positive words in the yes/no LDT did not
reach statistical significance in the items analysis). However, the
key and novel finding from Experiment 1, as revealed in the
regression analyses, was that emotional experience influenced
LDT performance above and beyond any influence of valence,
extremity of valence, and arousal. These facilitatory effects of
emotional experience support the idea that this dimension of
emotion information is partly driving the reported valence
effects by Kousta et al. (2009; Experiment 1) and Yap and Seow
(2014), and is thus an integral component of lexical-semantic
knowledge, independent of the pleasant-unpleasant or calm-
excited dimensions underlying lexical-semantic knowledge. We
will further consider ways in which the dimension of emotional
experience might differ from those of valence and arousal in
the General Discussion. This is the first reported instance of
facilitatory effects of emotional experience in LDT.
EXPERIMENT 2
One could argue that perhaps the emotional experience effects
observed in Experiment 1 were a result of the categorical manner
in which the stimuli were originally selected; that is, because
the items were specifically chosen for their negative, positive,
or neutral meanings. Since two-thirds of the stimuli used in
Experiment 1 were very negative or very positive, the impact
of emotional experience might have been an artifact of the
way these stimuli were selected. To address this issue, and
to examine whether these results would also be observed in
LDT using a different stimulus set, we conducted Experiment
2. In Experiment 2 we used a different stimulus set that
was: (a) not chosen on a categorical basis on the valence
dimension (or on the dimensions of emotional experience or
arousal); and (b) relatively more abstract, in order to test the
generality of emotional experience effects in LDT, because the
words used in Experiment 1 were relatively more concrete
and easily imageable (compare the mean concreteness and
imageability ratings for the stimuli used in Experiment 1, as
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TABLE 4 | Descriptive statistics for the abstract nouns used in
Experiment 2.
Variable Abstract words
M SD
Concreteness 2.6 0.7
Imageability 3.0 0.6
Age of acquisition 9.2 2.1
Familiarity 517.1 79.3
Log frequency 9.3 1.5
Orthographic neighborhood 1.4 3.1
Letters 7.0 1.6
Syllables 2.3 0.7
Morphemes 1.6 0.6
Mean positional bigram frequency 3836.6 1867.4
Emotional experience 3.5 1.3
Valence 5.3 1.3
Extremity of valence 1.1 0.8
Arousal 4.3 0.8
shown in Table 1, with those used in Experiment 2, as shown in
Table 4).
Method
Participants
Fifty UNBC undergraduate students participated in the
experiment; none of these individuals participated in
Experiment 1. All participants were native English speakers,
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and received
bonus course credit for their participation.
Stimuli
One hundred-fifty abstract nouns were used in the present
experiment. These stimuli were selected from the Toronto Word
Pool (Friendly et al., 1982), and the Paivio et al. (1968) work
banks and had concreteness and imageability ratings of 4.0 or
less. As was the case for Experiment 1, in addition to norms for
concreteness and imageability, we obtained norms for familiarity
(for 126 stimuli from the MRC psycholinguistic database, and
we collected familiarity norms for the remaining 24 stimuli
from a different group of 26 UNBC undergraduate students
using the same instructions as used by Toglia and Battig, 1978),
log frequency, orthographic neighborhood, number of letters,
syllables, andmorphemes, andmean positional bigram frequency
(all from the English Lexicon Project database), and age of
acquisition (from the Bristol norms database). The emotional
experience ratings were collected by Newcombe et al. (2012),
using the same instructions as provided in the Supplementary
Material. Means and SDs for the predictor variables are
shown in Table 43. One-hundred fifty nonwords, matched to
the words on number of letters, were used in the present
experiment.
3Data for six stimuli were removed due to error rates in excess of 30%, and
they were removed from all descriptive and inferential analyses reported for the
experiment.
Apparatus, Procedure, and Data Analysis
The apparatus, procedure, and hierarchical multiple regression
analysis used in the present experiment were identical to those
used for the go/no-go LDT of Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
The procedure used for the removal of outliers was the same as
that used in Experiment 1. This procedure resulted in removal
of a total of 272 responses (3.63% of the data) from the data
set. Word response errors comprised only 1.43% of trials, and
as such, the response error data were not analyzed. The raw
lexical decision latencies were z score transformed. Zero-order
correlations between the predictor variables and the criterion
variable are presented in Table 5.
The hierarchical multiple regression results are shown in
Table 6. In step 2, there was no significant change in latency
variability (∆R2 = 0.01) when valence, extremity of valence, and
arousal were added to the analysis. In interpreting this finding it
is important to note that the ranges of valence and arousal ratings
were not very large (see Table 4). In step 3, there was a significant
change in latency variability (∆R2 = 0.03): faster latencies were
associated with higher emotional experience ratings (sr=−0.18).
Thus, using a new set of stimuli that consisted of abstract nouns,
we again observed a significant facilitatory effect of emotional
experience in LDT, above and beyond any influence of valence,
extremity of valence, and arousal. Thus, the results of Experiment
2 suggest that the facilitatory effects of emotional experience
observed in Experiment 1 were not simply due to the categorical
manner in which the stimuli were selected (i.e., being specifically
chosen because they varied on the valence dimension), and that
such effects are observed for relatively more abstract nouns
in LDT.
EXPERIMENT 3
The stimulus set used in Experiment 1 consisted of words selected
on a categorical basis along the dimension of valence and in
Experiment 2 consisted of nouns that were relatively abstract.
In contrast, for Experiment 3 we selected a stimulus set that
consisted entirely of verbs. The semantic richness literature
has tended to focus on noun stimuli; verbs are a class of
words that has not been as extensively examined for semantic
richness effects (cf. Sidhu et al., 2014, 2016). This is especially
the case for the investigation of the influence of dimensions
of emotion information. Thus, the purpose of Experiment 3
was to examine whether emotional experience influences the
processing of verbs in LDT above and beyond any influence
of valence, extremity of valence, and arousal. If so, then this
finding would suggest that emotional experience is an integral
component of meaning for two important word classes, nouns
and verbs.
Method
The LDT data obtained for Experiment 3 were from Sidhu
et al. (2014; Experiment 1). In that study, 30 UC undergraduate
participants made LDT responses to 400 verbs and 400
nonwords. Each trial began with an asterisk, which then was
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TABLE 5 | Zero-order correlations between the criterion variable and the predictor variables in Experiment 2.
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Concreteness −
2. Imageability 0.06 −
3. AoA −0.04 −0.30* −
4. Familiarity 0.27* 0.07 −0.60* −
5. Log frequency 0.18* 0.01 −0.52* 0.61* −
6. N −0.09 0.01 −0.24* 0.12 0.12 −
7. Letters −0.19* 0.05 0.33* −0.23* −0.33* −0.45* −
8. Syllables −0.22* −0.04 0.39* −0.29* −0.32* −0.38* 0.71* −
9. Morphemes −0.15 −0.11 0.29* −0.17* −0.23* −0.20* 0.63* 0.56* −
10. MPBF 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.05 −0.09 −0.09 0.48* 0.16* 0.21* −
11. EE −0.35* 0.50* −0.23* −0.06 −0.04 0.07 −0.01 −0.06 −0.13 0.03 −
12. Valence −0.17* −0.08 −0.17* 0.12 0.30* −0.00 −0.08 0.03 −0.14 −0.08 −0.01 −
13. Extremity −0.15 0.39* −0.26* 0.02 0.09 −0.01 −0.06 −0.15 −0.19* −0.01 0.66* −0.07 −
14. Arousal −0.13 0.41* −0.12 −0.15 −0.10 0.09 0.05 −0.03 −0.08 0.02 0.57* −0.07 0.44* −
15. Latencies −0.13 −0.08 0.62* −0.62* −0.63* −0.15 0.35* 0.32* 0.27* 0.07 −0.18* −0.21* −0.01 −0.15 −
*p < 0.05. AoA, age of acquisition; N, orthographic neighborhood; MPBF, mean positional bigram frequency; EE, emotional experience.
TABLE 6 | Results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis of response
latencies in Experiment 2.
Variable B SEB β sr ∆R2 R2
Step 1 (control variables) 0.56***
Concreteness 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02
Imageability 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01
AoA 0.05 0.01 0.29 0.20**
Familiarity −0.00 0.00 −0.27 −0.19**
Log frequency −0.06 0.02 −0.27 −0.21**
N 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04
Letters 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.09
Syllables −0.04 0.04 −0.08 −0.05
Morphemes 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03
MPBF −0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.01
Step 2 0.01 0.57***
Valence −0.01 0.02 −0.02 −0.02
Extremity −0.01 0.03 −0.03 −0.02
Arousal −0.03 0.03 −0.06 −0.05
Step 3 0.03** 0.60***
Emotional experience −0.08 0.03 −0.31 −0.18**
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. AoA, age of acquisition; N, orthographic neighborhood; MPBF,
mean positional bigram frequency.
replaced by a letter string after 1500 ms. Verbs were presented
in their infinitive form (e.g., to leap), and nonwords were also
preceded by the word to. The raw lexical decision latencies were
z score transformed. Sidhu et al. (2014) analyzed LDT latencies
only for correct trials (the error rate was 3.45%, and as such an
analysis of errors was not carried out), and excluded trials on
which latencies were more than 2.5 SD from a participant’s mean
(<1% of the data). In addition, eight verbs were excluded from
the analyses due to high error rates (>30%), leaving a total of
392 verbs. These stimuli were the starting point for the present
analysis.
Sidhu et al. (2014) obtained norms for concreteness (Brysbaert
et al., 2014), imageability (Chiarello et al., 1999; Bird et al.,
2001), age of acquisition (Kuperman et al., 2012), log frequency,
orthographic neighborhood, number of letters, syllables, and
morphemes, and mean positional bigram frequency (all from
the English Lexicon Project database). For the purposes of the
present experiment, we collected emotional experience ratings
for 686 verbs (of which the 400 verbs for which Sidhu et al.,
2014, collected LDT latencies were a subset). These 686 verbs
were randomly assigned to one of two lists, and two groups of
UC undergraduate students (33 for the first list and 34 for the
second list; none of these participants provided LDT latencies
that were analyzed in the present experiment) provided the
emotional experience ratings using the instructions listed in the
Supplementary Material. We also obtained valence and arousal
norms fromWarriner et al. (2013); however, there were no values
for these two variables for 19 stimuli. Further, for a large number
of stimuli there were no familiarity values (from the MRC
psycholinguistic database), so this predictor was not included in
the present experiment. As such, the regression analyses below
include LDT latencies to 373 verbs. Descriptive characteristics
for this subset of the Sidhu et al. (2014) stimuli are presented
in Table 7. The complete set of emotional experience ratings
for 686 verbs are available from http://psychology.ucalgary.ca/
languageprocessing/node/22.
Results and Discussion
Zero-order correlations between the predictor variables and the
criterion variable are presented in Table 8. The hierarchical
multiple regression results are shown in Table 9. In step 2, there
was a significant change in latency variability (∆R2 = 0.02). Both
valence (sr = −0.08) and arousal (sr = −0.10) accounted for
a significant amount of unique variability: faster latencies were
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associated with higher valence and arousal ratings. Due to the
way Warriner et al. (2013) reverse scored (post-hoc) their valence
and arousal ratings, these findings reveal that faster latencies were
associated with words that were rated as relatively more positive
and more arousing. In step 3, there was a significant change in
latency variability (∆R2 = 0.01): faster latencies were associated
with higher emotional experience ratings (sr = −0.10). Thus,
when analyzing responses to a third set of stimuli that consisted
of verbs, we again observed a significant facilitatory effect of
emotional experience, and this effect was above and beyond
any influence of valence, extremity of valence, and arousal. The
results from the present experiment demonstrate that various
forms of emotion information contribute to the conceptual
understanding of a class of words that includes concepts referring
to actions, states, or relations; namely, verbs.
TABLE 7 | Descriptive statistics for the verbs used in Experiment 3.
Variable Verbs
M SD
Concreteness 3.1 0.8
Imageability 425.0 99.6
Age of acquisition 7.8 2.4
Log frequency 8.6 1.8
Orthographic neighborhood 4.7 5.8
Letters 5.6 1.6
Syllables 1.7 0.7
Morphemes 1.3 0.5
Mean positional bigram frequency 3585 1578
Emotional experience 3.7 0.8
Valence 5.1 1.3
Extremity of valence 1.1 0.8
Arousal 4.3 0.9
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The contributions to the second edition of theMeaning in mind:
Semantic richness effects in language processing Research Topic
examine the influence of different forms of semantic richness on
various aspects of language processing. The contribution of the
present study to this endeavor, as noted, was to examine whether
effects of emotional experience would be observed for different
types of words in LDT above and beyond any effects of valence
and arousal. Previous research has demonstrated that emotional
experience influences responding in SCT, word naming, and
Stroop tasks (Newcombe et al., 2012; Siakaluk et al., 2014; Moffat
et al., 2015). However, to date there are no published reports
examining the influence of emotional experience in LDT, yet LDT
is the most often used task to examine semantic richness effects
in the visual word recognition literature (Pexman, 2012).
To accomplish our objective, we used three different stimulus
sets: one set of words that was constructed on a categorical basis
along the dimension of valence (i.e., the stimulus set consisted
of negative, positive, and neutral words) (see Kousta et al., 2009;
Experiment 1, and Yap and Seow, 2014), a second set consisting
of abstract nouns, and a third set consisting of verbs. For each
experiment, we used hierarchical multiple regression analyses. In
step 1, we included a common set of control predictor variables
known to account for LDT latency variability. In step 2, we
included the emotionality dimensions of valence, extremity of
valence, and arousal. As noted, the valence dimension allows
for inferences about whether faster responses are made to more
negative or to more positive words, whereas the extremity of
valence dimension allows for inferences about whether faster
responses are made to more negative and more positive words,
regardless of valence polarity, than to neutral words (Adelman
and Estes, 2013). As such, this valence coding scheme provided
a thorough test of potential effects of the valence dimension.
We then entered emotional experience in step 3 of our analyses.
These regression analyses provided a rigorous test of the effects of
TABLE 8 | Zero-order correlations between the criterion variable and the predictor variables in Experiment 3.
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Concreteness −
2. Imageability 0.77* −
3. AoA −0.51* −0.51* −
4. Log frequency −0.06 −0.10 −0.52* −
5. N 0.31* 0.22* −0.49* 0.35* −
6. Letters −0.34* −0.24* 0.46* −0.29* −0.68* −
7. Syllables −0.48* −0.38* 0.53* −0.21* −0.60* 0.80* −
8. Morphemes −0.26* −0.27* 0.41* −0.25* −0.34* 0.46* 0.55* −
9. MPBF −0.15* −0.18* 0.22* −0.05 −0.12* 0.29* 0.26* 0.15* −
10. EE −0.26* −0.02 0.07 −0.02 −0.11* 0.14* 0.13* −0.07 −0.00 −
11. Valence −0.03 −0.02 −0.20* 0.22* 0.07 −0.01 −0.03 0.02 0.02 −0.09 −
12. Extremity 0.16* 0.28* −0.18* 0.00 0.05 0.01 −0.07 −0.20* −0.04 0.49* −0.12* −
13. Arousal 0.16* 0.27* −0.04 −0.09 0.02 −0.04 −0.06 −0.09 −0.07 0.37* −0.34* 0.38* −
14. Latencies −0.16* −0.17* 0.54* −0.61* −0.24* 0.33* 0.30* 0.17* 0.18* −0.04 −0.21* −0.03 −0.05 −
*p < 0.05. AoA, age of acquisition; N, orthographic neighborhood; EE, emotional experience.
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TABLE 9 | Results of hierarchical multiple regression analyses of response
latencies in Experiment 3.
Variable B SEB β sr ∆R2 R2
Step 1 (control variables) 0.48***
Concreteness 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
Imageability 0.00 0.00 −0.09 −0.06
AoA 0.04 0.01 0.27 0.16***
Log frequency −0.09 0.01 −0.51 −0.37***
N 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.14***
Letters 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.08*
Syllables 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.04
Morphemes −0.09 0.03 −0.14 −0.12**
MPBF 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06
Step 2 0.02* 0.50***
Valence −0.02 0.01 −0.09 −0.08*
Extremity 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04
Arousal −0.04 0.02 −0.12 −0.10**
Step 3 0.01** 0.51***
Emotional experience −0.05 0.02 −0.13 −0.10**
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. AoA, age of acquisition; N, orthographic
neighborhood; MPBF, mean positional bigram frequency.
emotional experience for different types of words in LDT, because
if any such effects were observed, they were above and beyond
any effects of the control and emotion predictor variables entered
in the previous two steps of the analyses. For each experiment
in the present study, we observed that emotional experience
accounted for a significant amount of unique LDT latency
variability, and that these effects were facilitatory, such that faster
LDT latencies were associated with higher emotional experience
ratings. These results indicate that effects of emotional experience
in LDT generalize to stimulus sets constructed in different ways
(i.e., categorized by valence, such as in Experiment 1, or not
categorized on any dimension of emotionality, as in Experiments
2 and 3), and comprised of different types of words (e.g., relatively
concrete words, relatively abstract nouns, and verbs).
Several inferences can be drawn from the facilitatory effects of
emotional experience in the present study. First, these effects are
consistent with task demands associated with the LDT. In LDT,
participants are required to determine if presented stimuli are
words or not. Any information, including semantic information,
that provides evidence that a stimulus is a word ought tomake the
decision more efficient, resulting in faster and/or more accurate
responding. The results of the present study demonstrate that
emotional experience, which assesses the ease with which words
evoke emotional experiences or information, is a dimension of
emotion knowledge, above and beyond those of valence and
arousal, that makes lexical decisions more efficient, and thus is
an integral component of lexical semantics. Below, we offer a
proposal for how emotional experience might tap into different
aspects of emotion knowledge that arise from situated bodily
contexts as compared to valence and arousal.
Second, facilitatory effects of emotional experience in LDT
can be accounted for through the process of semantic feedback.
According to the semantic feedback activation framework (Hino
and Lupker, 1996), the visual word recognition system is
composed of three distinct yet interconnected sets of units;
namely, orthographic units (that process spelling information),
phonological units (that process sound information), and
semantic units (that process meaning information). Importantly,
processing among one set of units may influence processing in
the other sets of units via feedforward and feedback activation. Of
relevance to performance in the LDT, word/nonword decisions
are ultimately based on activation among orthographic units;
however, activation from semantic units may feedback to
orthographic units, subsequently enhancing their processing
efficiency. The idea is that semantically richer words should
elicit greater activation among semantic units, leading to greater
feedback from these units to orthographic units, resulting
in faster settling of orthographic representations, and hence
faster LDT responses. This account is consistent with the
pattern of effects we observed in the present study: words with
higher ratings of emotional experience, which we assume have
richer emotional semantic representations, were associated with
faster LDT latencies.
Third, the facilitatory effects of emotional experience are
consistent with different frameworks of grounded cognition. For
example, according to the perceptual symbol systems framework
(Barsalou, 1999) and the notion of situated conceptualization
(Barsalou, 2003, 2009; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011; Barrett
et al., 2014), the development of conceptual knowledge is highly
contingent on (or grounded in) sensory, motor, and emotion
experiences across a variety of situated contexts. The semantic
representation framework of Vigliocco et al. (2009) is similar
in that it proposes that different types of bodily experience
contribute to the development of conceptual knowledge. An
important component of this latter framework is the emphasis
it places on how emotion information, which is associated
with internal, bodily processes that track environmental context,
largely underlies the comprehension of abstract concepts.
Kiverstein and Miller (2015) have also recently emphasized
that situated context and emotion knowledge play important
roles in the development, processing, and retrieval of conceptual
knowledge. Further, we assume that emotion knowledge is
multidimensional. Thus, it is highly unlikely that just one or
two dimensions of emotionality, such as valence and arousal,
will be sufficient to capture the entire richness and complexity
of knowledge gained through bodily emotion experience. In
what follows, we will attempt to provide a proposal in which
the contribution of emotional experience is disentangled from
the contributions of valence and arousal in the development,
processing, and retrieval of conceptual knowledge. To do so, we
will use as examples three words that were presented as stimuli in
Experiment 1.
First, take the concept “failure.” As the notion of situated
conceptualization emphasizes, “failure” does not occur in a
contextual vacuum, nor is it tied to just one specific situated
context (Barsalou, 2003), but arises from an essentially unlimited
number of situated contexts (such as sporting events, academic
efforts, business endeavors, personal relationships, etc.). Because
of the rich diversity of lived, bodily experience, emotion
knowledge will be integral to the understanding of “failure.” In
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addition, as noted, emotion knowledge will be multidimensional.
The two traditional dimensions of emotionality, valence and
arousal, will account for important aspects of “failure.”
Most obviously, “failure” will be experienced as negative or
unpleasant (its valence rating is 1.70, with “1” anchoring the
negative/unpleasant end of the scale). Some “failures” will be
mild, some moderate, and some intense, and thus will be, on
average, somewhat arousing (its arousal rating is 4.95). Kiverstein
and Miller (2015) suggest that valence and arousal tap into
basic and specific dimensions of emotion knowledge that can be
abstracted across different situated contexts. Further, these are
two important emotionality dimensions that are easily accessible
to internal emotion systems evolutionarily designed to track basic
and salient environmental features that may impact survival.
For example, the automatic vigilance hypothesis (Pratto and
John, 1991; Wentura et al., 2000) has been proposed to account
for the attention-grabbing effects of negative and arousing
stimuli, such that individuals who paid greater attention to
negative and arousing stimuli were more likely to survive in
past environments. Another hypothesis that has been proposed
to account for how emotionally charged stimuli, regardless of
valence polarity, may increase attention to environmental stimuli
is the motivated attention and affective states hypothesis (Lang
et al., 1990, 1997). Yet, as important as valence and arousal are
in providing emotion information for conceptual knowledge, the
results of the present study demonstrate that they do not exhaust
all the potential dimensions of emotionality available through
lived experience.
In the Introduction section we noted that Siakaluk et al.
(2014) proposed that the emotional experience dimension taps
into core person-environment regularities that exist across
situated bodily contexts in which a given concept is relevant.
The notion of situated conceptualization underscores the idea
that although any particular situated context may have unique
features (e.g., specific individuals, events, outcomes), aggregated
across all situated contexts in which a given concept is relevant,
there will likely be core person-environment regularities. We
propose expanding what emotional experience may tap into
in the following way. Kiverstein and Miller (2015) specifically
emphasized that there are tight feedback links between cognition
and emotion in conceptual processing, and as such the processing
of emotion information is strongly associated with cognitive
processes, such as reasoning, attention, memory, and planning.
They stated that much neuroscience research suggests that
there are “reciprocal interconnection[s] between cortical and
subcortical structures” (p. 3), which allow for cognitive processes
to influence affective processes and for affective processes to
influence cognitive processes. With this in mind, we propose that
core person-environment regularities across situated contexts
that the dimension of emotional experiencemay track ought to be
emotionally and cognitively salient or relevant to an individual;
that is, that the regularities can be monitored by neural systems
dedicated to the processing of perceptual, motor, emotion, and
other forms of introspective information (such as interpretative
and causal processing).
We agree with Kiverstein and Miller’s (2015) suggestion that
valence and arousal are basic affective processes that interconnect
with cognitive processes such that the emotion information
provided by these two dimensions of emotion experience “inform
the organism that there is something in the environment
of potential relevance or value” (p. 6). However, important
these emotion-cognition interconnections are (and they are
important), we suggest that there could be higher-order emotion-
cognition interconnections that augment conceptual processing,
and that this may be what the dimension of emotional experience
measures. Before attempting to explicate this idea with the
“failure” example below, it is important to underscore the idea
that the more basic emotionality dimensions of valence and
arousal and the potentially higher order dimension of emotional
experience are also interconnected, such that there is likely to be
overlap in what they are gauging across situated contexts. The
correlational results of the present study support this conjecture,
with correlations between emotional experience and extremity
of valence ranging from 0.49 to 0.66, and correlations between
emotional experience and arousal ranging from 0.37 to 0.57.
Despite these relationships, our results suggest that emotional
experience also measures something unique from either valence
or arousal.
Returning to the “failure” example, at the heart of this concept
is the understanding that a desired or expected outcome did
not come about. What sorts of higher order emotion-cognition
interconnections could the dimension of emotional experience
be tracking across situated contexts, such as those listed
above (sporting events, academic efforts, business endeavors,
personal relationships, etc.)? Some possibilities include the
following: manner of speaking with fellow agents (e.g., the
tone of voice may change); retrieval from memory of past
failures and accompanying affective states (e.g., thinking that
the course of events cannot be changed and will therefore
lead to an undesired outcome, and associated feelings of
helplessness); focused attention on negative stimuli and not on
positive stimuli (e.g., focusing on others who appear to share
one’s view that the situation is hopeless while ignoring those
who are more positive); developing cognitive appraisals as to
potential causes of the failure (e.g., noting lack of preparation,
skill, or motivation); and contextually appropriate introspective
inferences and judgments (e.g., updating one’s self-esteem);
among many others. To reiterate, we propose that although
the specifics will be unique to each individual situated context,
there will be core person-environment regularities that may be
abstracted across all situated contexts in which “failure” occurs.
The point we are emphasizing here is that the dimension of
emotional experience may be tapping into conceptual knowledge
that relies on the development of relatively more complex
emotion-cognition feedback loops that arise through lived
bodily experience across a wide array of different situated
contexts.
Two other examples are potentially informative. First,
consider the concept “success.” “Success” and “failure” differ
greatly on the dimension of valence (their respective valence
ratings are 8.29 and 1.70), but they happen to have precisely the
same rating on the dimension of emotional experience (6.07). An
intriguing question, therefore, is how qualitatively different types
of experience (e.g., having a successful vs. unsuccessful personal
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relationship) may lead to similar emotional experience ratings.
There are several possible components that may account for this.
First, any major differences in the type of experience are likely to
be accounted for by the dimensions of valence and arousal, which
track more basic aspects of situated contexts, such as whether
they are pleasant-unpleasant, and of low or high arousal. Second,
although initially somewhat counterintuitive, the concepts
of “success” and “failure” are similar in the sense that these
concepts are embedded in many situated contexts that are rich
in salient higher order emotion-cognition interconnections. The
examples of higher order emotion-cognition interconnections
provided above (manner of speaking with fellow agents;
retrieval from memory of similar events and their outcomes
and accompanying affective states; focused attention on
some stimuli while ignoring other stimuli; developing
cognitive appraisals as to potential causes; and contextually
appropriate introspective inferences and judgments) suggest
that similarly rich sets of core person-environment regularities
may underlie concepts as different in valence as “success” and
“failure.”
Further, the differences between “success” and “failure” are
likely to be attenuated in the LDT. The development of both
concepts will lead to rich sets of emotional-semantic features
(what we’ve been referring to as core person-environment
regularities) that may be brought to bear in the LDT. Although
the set of core person-environment regularities associated with
“success” is likely to be very different from the set associated
with “failure,” the point here is that each of these two concepts
will be associated with rich sets of emotional-semantic features.
The activation of these sets of features will facilitate processing
in the LDT for each concept, because their relative richness
provides strong evidence that they are words (Pexman, 2012).
Under different task demands, particularly those that require
fine-grained decisions about meaning (e.g., using the criteria
of “is the concept pleasant?” or “is the concept unpleasant?”),
the differences between these two concepts may be more
apparent.
Finally, consider the concept “cause,” for which the mean
emotional experience rating is just 2.30 (its valence and arousal
ratings are 5.07 and 4.20, respectively). Given this low emotional
experience rating, we infer that it is unlikely that “cause”
has a rich set of core person-environmental regularities that,
crucially, are emotionally or cognitively salient or relevant to
an individual. Instead, it may be that what is an underlying
“cause” is interpreted or understood with a different concept;
such as “hunger” to understand why someone ate something, or
“anger” to understand why someone said something negative. In
the LDT, the relatively impoverished set of emotional-semantic
features associated with “cause” will not provide much evidence
that it is a word, thus not facilitating LDT performance to the
same extent that is the case for the concepts “success” and
“failure.”
Of course, our account here is speculative. Certainly, these
ideas will need to be tested in future research. Nonetheless,
the present study demonstrates that semantic richness effects
of emotional experience—faster latencies to words rated higher
on this dimension—are observed in LDT. These effects were
observed in three LDTs using different stimulus sets and
suggest generalization to both nouns and verbs. These effects
are independent of any effects of valence and arousal. These
findings are important because they underscore the idea that
knowledge gained through emotion experience is multifaceted.
Intuition and reflection amply demonstrate that the dimensions
of valence and arousal are important aspects of lived experience,
and research cited above has demonstrated that these types of
emotion knowledge influence performance in LDT. However,
the results of the present study suggest that valence and
arousal do not exhaust all dimensions of emotionality that
underlie conceptual knowledge. The relatively new emotionality
dimension of emotional experience accounts for LDT latency
variability above and beyond that accounted for by valence and
arousal. Taken together with previous research reporting effects
of emotional experience in other visual word recognition tasks, it
seems reasonable to conclude that emotional experience should
be considered alongside such dimensions as valence and arousal
in order to capture the multidimensionality of lexical (emotion)
semantics.
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